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Abstract
Underlying parameter estimates suggest that reduction in pork exporters’ profit is
three times higher when the Japanese GATT safeguard is invoked, providing incentive to
foreign suppliers to collude to avoid exceeding the trigger.  This collusion is welfare-
improving since the safeguard induces more inefficiencies.  Workable and efficient
allocation rules are constructed with a multi-plant monopolist structure that allows trade
of quota.
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1.  Introduction
Whereas pork claims the largest and most stable share in Japan’s per capita total
meat consumption at 40 percent, its swine-pork sector has contracted at 2.5 percent each
year since 1990.  As a result, the share of imports to total consumption increased
significantly from a mere 9 percent in 1980 to 44 percent in 1996.  Also, Japan’s pork
imports are the largest in the world, representing 38.31 percent.
Japan uses a price stabilization band in beef and pork to meet its policy objectives
of ensuring food security, stabilizing prices, and maintaining a rural living standard that is
comparable to that of urban areas.  A farm-to-wholesale-price transmission function that
estimates a transmission elasticity and distribution of the error structure (i.e., k ® N(mk,
sk)) is key in determining the price band.  The midpoint of the price band is determined
using an average of the farm price adjusted by an index of the annual cost of finishing
slaughter-ready swine, and translated into wholesale price using the price transmission
elasticity.  The floor price is derived from the midpoint price by subtracting one standard
deviation of the regression error estimate, and adding one standard deviation of the
regression error estimate to the midpoint price derives the ceiling price.  The Livestock
Industry Promotion Corporation (LIPC) intervenes in the market through its purchase (or
storage subsidy granted to producers) and selling activities to ensure that market price
always moves within the limits of the band.  Moreover, the price band is supported at the
border by requiring that all imports enter at a minimum import price called the gate price,
which is linked directly to the midpoint of the price stabilization band.  Prior to the GATT
agreement, a variable levy was used to implement the gate price policy.  Imports with CIF
values above the gate price are charged an ad valorem tax of 5 percent.3
The GATT rules have radically altered Japan’s import policies. Although the gate
price was maintained, it is effectively decoupled from the stabilization price band and is
subject to reduction commitments until 2000.  The variable levy has been converted into
specific tax, and together with the ad valorem duty, is also subject to reduction
commitments.  However, the implementation of specific taxes that exempts any excess of
the import price from the standard import price (SP, i.e., gate price with ad valorem duties
applied) make it still behave like a variable levy.
The more compelling impact of GATT is on the safeguard provisions intended to
protect importers from excess surges in imports.  For Japan, when the cumulative sum of
pork imports at the end of each quarter exceeds their average of the last three years by
119 percent, the safeguard (SG) can be invoked where the gate price is raised by 24
percent and is in effect for the rest of Japan’s fiscal year (ending March 31).  Also, a
special safeguard provision (SSG) granted in Section 4 of Article VI of the Agreement on
Agriculture, provides that when the annual sum of pork imports at the end of the year
exceeds 105 percent of their average level in the last three years, Japan can impose an
additional duty, not to exceed one-third of the ordinary customs duty.  Also, when the SG
is in effect in the year when SSG is invoked, the SG is extended to the first quarter of the
next fiscal year. Since implementation of the WTO agreement, Japan has invoked the SG
provision only twice and the SSG once.
The share of Taiwan in Japan's fresh-chilled and frozen market of 47 percent and
37 percent dropped to zero and to 2.15 percent, respectively, after FMD was confirmed
by OIE.  The United States captured Taiwan’s share in the fresh-chilled market, with its
share increasing from 46 percent in 1996 to 75 percent in 1997. Canada follows the4
United States with its share increasing from 4.66 to 14 percent.  On the other hand,
Denmark captured Taiwan’s share in the frozen market category with its share increasing
from 24.13 to 32.38 percent.
This paper first determines whether foreign suppliers have an incentive to collude
to influence policy parameters, and whether such collusion is welfare improving.  Second,
we construct rules of sharing out the market, under the collusion scenario, that is both
workable and efficient.  To address these general objectives, the paper examines three
specific goals: (1) to provide a detailed description of the trade policies affecting pork
imports in Japan;  (2) to analyze the impacts of the GATT safeguards; (3) to provide new
supply and demand elasticity estimates from highly disaggregated and more recent
monthly data.
2.  Model
Consider a partial equilibrium model that includes a demand function [1a],
domestic supply function [1b], supply function of foreign suppliers [1c], and policy
function [1d], i.e.,
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The arguments in the functions are domestic and world price p, vector of other arguments
Z, random errors y, vector of parameters F, and policy parameter Q.  The subscripts are
demand (d), and supply (s), and superscript is world (w).  What is distinct in this model is5
that it allows foreign suppliers to influence domestic policy parameters, which then affects
their decision rule.
This model can represent three distinct outcomes that are possible in the Japanese
pork import market.  Case 1 is when the SG trigger is not binding; that is, Q
T ³ Q
M.  In
this case SG is never triggered (i.e., Q = 0) and the market determines the equilibrium
import level (Q
M).  Case 2 is the more interesting case when the SG trigger is binding (i.e.,
Q
T £ Q
M), and the gate price is raised when Q
T is exceeded (i.e., Q = l).  The outcome is a
reduction in the level of pork import at a certain Q
S.  Since the SG trigger Q
T is set by
GATT rules independent of the underlying domestic supply and demand structure that
generates realizations of the import level under SG (i.e., Q
S), there is no a priori
relationship between the two.  However, case 2 becomes interesting to foreign suppliers
only when Q
S £ Q
T.  Otherwise, when Q
T £ Q
S the SG is always triggered, which is case 3.








where t is the distance in percent between Q
M to Q
T, which largely depends on how fast
current consumption grows and production declines relative to the average of the last
three years, l is the allowable increase in the gate price, and eed is the excess demand
elasticity.  Excess demand is defined as  ) ( ) ( · - · = S D ED , with elasticity of the form,
[3]  s s d d s ed w w e e e - = ,6
where ed is demand elasticity of [1a], es is supply elasticity of [1b], and w is the ratio of
supply and demand to excess demand, respectively.
 Under a policy with quantity trigger and specific duty, the measure of suppliers’
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where es
w is the supply elasticity of the foreign suppliers in [1c] and a is the proportion of
net profit to total revenue.  The sign of [4] is depends on the sign of the parameters only
and not on their relative magnitudes.  Since l, a, es
w are non-negative, the sign of [4] is
always non-positive because eed is always non-positive.  This suggests that foreign
suppliers are always worse-off when SG is invoked.  Hence, an incentive to collude among
suppliers to avoid triggering the SG always exists.  The strength of the incentive, however,
is depends primarily on the relative magnitudes of the parameters.  That is, on the supply
side, the more inelastic (elastic) the supply function of foreign suppliers the stronger
(weaker) is the incentive to collude.  On the demand side, the more elastic (inelastic) the
excess demand function the stronger (weaker) the incentive to collude.
We use a multi-plant monopolist structure to derive workable and efficient rules of
allocating market share under a collusion scenario. Under this scenario, aggregate output
is constrained in the neighborhood of the SG trigger.  The rule for efficient allocation is to
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Historical shares can be used to determine an initial allocation.  Then allowing free trade
of quota rights will result to an allocation approaching the rule given in [5].
Consumer and producer surplus measures are used to examine the welfare
implications of the collusion scenario.
3.  Data, Estimation, Results, and Discussion
Data are from the Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation’s Monthly
Statistics, covering November 1992 to August 1998.  All estimations used Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR) and were conducted in SAS, release 6.12
The first SG was invoked from November 1, 1995 to March 31, 1996.  The
second SG was invoked on July 1, 1996 until March 31, 1997.  With the low imports in
1997 and 1998, and the continuing decline in domestic pork production, it is very likely
that the SG trigger may be exceeded again when Japan’s economy recovers.
The 1995 and 1996 SG increased both the level and volatility of retail price.  With
the 24 percent rise in the gate price under the SG (i.e., 140 y/kg), retail price increased in
the expected range of 17 to 34 percent (i.e., 150 to 200 y/kg).  Also, due to speculative
purchases and stockholding, the SG and SSG have created price variability that is much
higher than normal in non-SG periods.  Figure 1 shows the changes in retail pork prices.
Moreover, the higher gate price raised the CIF of imported pork.  Since the gate price
does not differentiate between fresh-chilled or frozen pork imports, the CIF of both types
of products are similarly impacted by the gate price policy.  That is, with a higher gate
price, foreign suppliers use a product strategy to come up with a product mix that gives a
CIF value that is in the neighborhood of the gate price (see figure 2).  In effect, even with
the higher specific tax, GOJ revenue may not increase proportionately because CIF also8
rises as the gate price is increased.  In the 1995 SG, while the gate price increased by
Y140/kg, the increase in tax revenue was only Y16/kg.  In the 1996 SG, while the gate
price increased by Y137/kg, tax revenue actually declined by Y6/kg.
Furthermore, the SG has an impact on the level and timing of imports and stocks.
Figure 3 seems to suggest that during normal periods Japan hold an inventory that is
equivalent to 73 percent of its monthly pork consumption and imports 100 percent of the
deficit between domestic production and consumption in a given month.  This pattern has
changed radically with the SG and SSG.  Both in the 1995 and 1996 SG and SSG,
speculative purchases raised the import level to 211 to 258 percent of domestic deficit,
while stocks increased to 119 to 240 percent of consumption.
Since the magnitude of the underlying supply and demand elasticity is an important
determinant of the strength of the incentive to collude, we estimate a new supply and
demand elasticity using more disaggregated and recent monthly data.  On the demand side,
[1a] is specified as an AIDS meat demand system, which includes beef, pork, and broilers.
Imported beef and imported pork are treated as a differentiated product to generate tighter
estimates.  The formula in Green and Alston (1990, 1991) is used to estimate demand
elasticities.  On the supply side, [1b] is separated into two functions representing the
number of swine slaughtered and the average slaughter weight.  Total supply is a product
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Strong preference by Japanese consumers for domestic pork over imports may
explain the low expenditure elasticity for imported pork (see table 1).  The uncompensated
elasticities suggest that domestic pork is a net complement to domestic beef (and vice9
versa), and imported pork is a net complement to imported beef (and vice versa).  That is,
the substitution effect is larger than the income effect.
The downward trend in the estimated number slaughtered reflects the declining
swine inventory base.  The responsiveness of pork supply at 0.231 is largely contributed
by the slaughter weight elasticity at 0.161, rather than the elasticity of the number
slaughtered, which is only 0.07.  That is, since the current policy regime is more likely to
generate temporary price movements, producers are likely to respond through slaughter
weights rather than through the number slaughtered due to the flexibility it affords and the
lower fixed cost involved.
A comparison of elasticities in table 2 indicates that the estimate using monthly
data gives higher demand elasticity but lower supply elasticity.  Since the data are
monthly, the responsiveness of supply may not fully capture the response through the
inventory.
Also, table 2 gives the pork excess demand elasticity estimates using equation [3]
with supply and demand elasticities from OECD, FAPRI, and new estimates, and the level
of pork production and consumption for 1995 to 1998 from PS&D.  The excess demand
elasticity is greater than one for all years in all models, with the elasticity from monthly
data giving the largest (in absolute value) excess demand elasticity of –1.773.  Using this
elasticity and assumed values for the other parameters, table 3 shows that the rate of net
profit reduction is three times larger when the SG is invoked than under the collusion
scenario that avoids triggering the SG.
There are several losers when the SG and SSG are invoked.  Foreign suppliers lose
revenue.  Japanese pork processors pay higher prices for imported frozen pork and higher10
storage cost.  Consumers are worse-off with limited availability of pork imports at a
higher price.  The winners are the GOJ with added tax revenue and domestic producers
with higher prices.  But an increase in GOJ revenue from duties may not be very
significant, and with price more volatile and increases not permanent, the long-run benefit
to domestic producers is also suspect.
The reduction in consumer surplus between the initial equilibrium
vector ) , , , (
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The first term of the RHS represents the portion of the consumer surplus that is purely
transferred to domestic producers.  The remaining three terms are losses due to
inefficiencies induced by the SG.  The second term of the RHS is the additional
deadweight loss caused by the larger wedge created by the SG between market price and
marginal cost.  The third term in the RHS represents the inefficiency caused by the
substitution of the low-cost imports with high-cost domestic supply.  Since foreign
suppliers respond to the higher specific tax with a product mix strategy that raises their
CIF to the neighborhood of the new higher gate price, welfare losses may not be fully
recovered through higher tax revenue because the tax revenue may not actually increase
proportionately.  That is, the inefficiency caused as foreign suppliers substitute low-cost
products mix with high-cost product mix imports to avoid paying the higher specific tax11
may approach the last term.  Moreover, the losses from higher production cost of
domestic supply may actually be higher and the surplus appropriated by producers may
actually be smaller when the higher cost of storage is accounted for, causing the domestic
supply function to move to the left (shifts or rotate).
Clearly, since larger consumer surplus is lost from inefficiencies induced by the
SG, collusion among foreign suppliers to avoid triggering the SG is welfare improving.
4.  Summary and Conclusion
Under the present pork import policy regime, there is always an incentive for
foreign suppliers to collude to avoid exceeding the SG trigger.  The strength of this
incentive depends on the magnitude of the underlying supply, demand, and policy
parameters.  Measured by the net profit of suppliers, the more inelastic (elastic) the supply
function the stronger (weaker) the incentive, and the more elastic (inelastic) the excess
demand function the stronger (weaker) the incentive to collude.
Rules for sharing out the market under the collusion scenario use a multi-plant
monopolist structure that includes provision for trade of export quota rights to allow low-
cost supplier to increase its share and improve efficiency.
It is also shown that this collusion is welfare improving.12
































































First entry in a cell is marshallian elasticity and the second entry is hicksian elasticity
Table 2. Excess demand elasticity estimates
1995 1996 1997 1998 Average
Supply 1322 1266 1283 1290 1290 Levels
(000 mt) Demand 2063 2119 2081 2080 2086
Elasticity
Models Supply Demand Excess Demand
   OECD 0.440 -0.300 -1.620 -1.398 -1.490 -1.508 -1.504
   FAPRI 0.520 -0.310 -1.791 -1.542 -1.644 -1.665 -1.661
   Own 0.231 -0.532 -1.893 -1.664 -1.758 -1.777 -1.773
Table 3. Comparison of net profit change (in percent) under SG and collusion scenario
a = 30 percent
Scenario es
w =  4·eed es
w =  3·eed es
w =  2·eed
   Safeguard Invoked -30 -40 -60
   Collusion no SG -10 -13 -1913
Figure 1. Retail price changes for domestic and imported pork
Figure 2. Gate price, standard import price, and CIF
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